THE images of two young men being publicly caned in Aceh last month for engaging in homosexual relations shocked Australians.
The foreign minister raised ‘serious concerns’ directly with her Indonesian counterpart; the Prime Minister agreed with a radio talkshow host’s suggestion that it was ‘barbaric’. Other figures, meanwhile, went further, calling for aid to be stopped and raising questions about Indonesia’s moderate and pluralistic status. In the main, though, it was a united show of concern (in Bahasa Indonesia).
Aceh / Vanina W / Flickr
In Indonesia, human rights organisations called for a review and moratorium (in Bahasa Indonesia) of Aceh’s laws under which the punishment was carried out, labelling them incompatible with basic human rights. But the issue did not stimulate a public reaction of a similar proportion.
While Aceh’s Islamic laws are particular to that province—Aceh, with special autonomy status, mandated Islamic law in 2006 after reaching a peace agreement with Jakarta—the narrowing of freedoms for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual and intersex (LGBTI) community has worsened more generally in recent years. As a result, the treatment of LGBTI Indonesians is an issue that is becoming internationalised.
Last month, several countries raised concerns about the treatment of the LGBTI community with Indonesia during its Universal Periodic Review at the United Nations Human Rights Council. The need to better protect LGBTI people was one of 75 recommendations that the Indonesian government declined to accept immediately, with others in this category including the removal of the death penalty and blasphemy law. While it accepted 150 others upfront—including recommendations to better protect the rights of children, women and disabled people, and improve access to health and education—the government will consult on the status of the remaining 75 before delivering a reply to the UN in September.
Indonesia has made a remarkable transformation into a vibrant democracy, earning its status as a beacon for democracy and human rights in South-East Asia. Foreign governments have, however, largely self-sensored public critique of ongoing human rights issues, considering it more important to maintain positive relations with a country of such growing strategic and economic weight. It is worth noting, though: Australia’s human rights record continues to face sustained critique from within and without. For Indonesia, it seems that the LGBTI issue has the potential to put the country back in an unwanted international spotlight. In particular, it has the potential to become an irritant in relations with the West.
Indonesia is unlikely to ever bend to international pressure on this issue. There are a couple of reasons to believe this to be the case. Firstly, the gap in values between Indonesian society and others, such as Australian society, has widened. As admirable as efforts are to build people-to-people relations between our citizens, misunderstanding will remain. Ordinary Indonesians and Australians view the world through very different lenses.
The period since Indonesian democratisation began has witnessed a transformation of not just government but society. Two trends have occurred simultaneously with democratisation, though not necessarily as a result of it—trends toward Islamisation and conservatism. The content of the collective ‘Muslim’ identity has changed dramatically (1). The Islamisation process has been evident in not only the politicisation of religion but also the increased expression of Islamic identity culturally. More Indonesians wear Islamic dress, study Arabic and ‘consume’ Islam (2).
Increased religiosity does not, of course, equate to more conservatism or fundamentalism, as religious observance takes many forms (3). But conservative forces have triumphed in a process of social contestation (4), leading to the rise of Islamic orthodoxy. This shift, labelled a conservative turn by scholars in the field (5), has broken the monopoly on public discourse once held by traditional and more progressive Islamic forces.
For many other countries, especially Western countries, the past decade has witnessed a liberal turn. Same-sex marriage has been realised in more than 20 countries. The cause appears to enjoy high support elsewhere, such as in Australia. Not only are activist groups well organised on domestic LGBTI issues but they are also paying close attention to LGBTI issues globally.
Secondly, it appears that powerful forces in Indonesia have found political advantage in targeting minorities such as the LGBTI community and, indeed, religious sects, viewing them as national threats. Pluralistic national leaders are now vulnerable to such campaigns. Asked his opinion of the treatment of the LGBTI community, President Widodo gave mixed signals last year, stressing that while there was no discrimination against minorities, in Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, ‘we have norms’ (in Bahasa Indonesia).
Much of the commentary about recent events in Indonesia, including about the successful blasphemy case against the former governor of Jakarta, has called into question Indonesia’s moderate status. Some have pondered the threat to Australia of an ‘aggressive Islamist state’. Speaking about Indonesia’s status as a moderate country in light of the Aceh case last month, an Australian foreign affairs official argued that it remained so, saying: “…homosexuality is not a crime at all, in the whole of Indonesia, so if you compare Indonesia to many Muslim countries and other countries where homosexuality is illegal, I think you can say that Indonesia is a moderate Muslim country, yes” (6). Compared to places like Saudi Arabia, Indonesia is, without doubt, moderate. But against the standards it has set for itself since its democratisation began, recent events are some cause for concern.
It is not surprising that many Indonesians are sensing that it is time to put a check on rising intolerance. Indonesians at home and around the world attended, en masse, candlelight vigils following the Ahok verdict. Jokowi himself has spearheaded the social media campaign Saya Indonesia, Saya Pancasila (I’m Indonesia, I’m Pancasila) to promote the national ideology and protect pluralism.
Diplomatically, a difficulty for Indonesia and for those who engage with it is that the foundation of the country’s soft power—it being viewed as a tolerant, pluralist, moderate country where Islam and democracy co-exist—appears to be departing from reality. For at least the past 10 years, such notions have underpinned Indonesia’s ‘national role conceptions’—that is, how it has viewed itself in the world. These role conceptions have imagined Indonesia as a bridge builder between the West and the Muslim world, a peacemaker in the Muslim world and a model of a moderate Muslim-majority democracy.
In a global era defined by terrorism, the moderate image has been especially advantageous in enabling Indonesia to aspire to a bigger global role by ‘selling’ a model of democracy and moderate Islam (7). In practical terms, however, these role conceptions have remained largely aspirational. To me, they seem to have operated primarily at an elite level, serving in an instrumentalist way for the government—especially the former Yudhoyono administration—to advance its image-building efforts abroad.
In response to recent developments, Australian leaders have balanced their publicly expressed concerns by re-affirming their belief in Indonesia’s moderate nature. Low-key, direct responses—such as Minister Bishop’s representations to Minister Marsudi following the Aceh case—have always been best for the relationship, instead of engaging in megaphone diplomacy.
But, given the boisterous nature of our respective democratic systems, dampening down the public’s responses to issues such as the treatment of LGBTI people, and limiting any negative fallout, will not always be possible. Indeed, as the societal trends indicate, it may only prove more challenging.
By @si_gladman
Sources
(1) I use the understanding of content of identity provided by R. Abdelal, Y. M. Herrera, A. I. Johnston & R. McDermott, 2006, Identity as a Variable, in Perspectives of Politics, December, Vol 4, No. 4.
(2) M.C.Ricklefs, 2012, Islamisation and its Opponents in Java, NUS Press, Singapore; G. Fealy, 2005, Islamisation and Politics in South East Asia, chapter 8, in N. Lahoud & A. Johns, eds, Islam in n World Politics.
(3) G. Fealy, 2005, Islamisation and Politics in South East Asia, chapter 8, in N. Lahoud & A. Johns, eds, Islam in n World Politics, p152.
(4) I use the understanding of contestation of identity provided by Abdelal, R, Herrera, Y.M., Johnston, A.I., McDermott, R.,2006, Identity as a VAriable, in Perspectives of Politics, December, Vol 4, No. 4
(5) M. van Bruinessen, 2013, Contemporary developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the ‘conservative turn’, ISEAS, Singapore; A. Ibrahim, 2014, Denying and Trivialising Pluralism: The Challenges of Managing Diversity in Multireligious Malaysia and Indonesia, chapter 5, in A Ibrahim, Contemporary Islamic Discourse in the MalayIndonesian World, SIRD, Malaysia, p185.
(6) See the discussion on page 91 of the Senate estimates transcript of the Senate’s Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee
(7) A. Nugraha, 2012, Moderate Islam as New Identity in Indonesian Foreign Policy: Between Global Role Aspiration and Co-Religious Solidarity.
Between the reefs 